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In 1991, Laurence Summers, then chief economist at the World Bank, suggested that the World Bank should encourage the migration of dirty industries to less developed countries. This recommendation was based on a cost benefit evaluation of the respective costs to more and less developed countries. Specifically, Summers said,
The measurement of the costs of health-impairing pollution depends on the foregone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality. From this point of view a given amount of health-impairing pollution should be done with the lowest wages. I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that. (Summers, quoted in Hausman and McPherson, 1996: 9) This is evaluating a policy from a cost benefit point of view. Economic perspectives have become increasingly popular throughout the world as governments reduce costs and prune programs. Economists occupy influential places in government policy making and conduct economic analyses throughout all sectors of society. Cost benefit models have been applied in World Bank programs and in countries like New Zealand, Australia and Britain (Boston et al., 1996; Henkel, 1991; Kelsey, 1995; Pusey, 1991) .
I do not want to deny the efficacy of cost benefit evaluation nor the use of economic criteria in evaluations, but there are some serious problems in some cases, as illustrated by this example. Few of us would condone the shifting of pollution from the developed world to the less developed. And, indeed, Summers' suggestion was met with outrage when it was made public. (The idea was broached in an internal World Bank memo.) There seems to be something unfair and even unjust about making a child in a less developed country suffer pollution effects so that people in other countries can have higher material standards of living. What's wrong with this mode of evaluation?
First, we must distinguish between good and bad cost analyses. There are many types -cost effectiveness, cost benefit, cost utility, cost feasibility -and all types can be done well or badly. Cost benefit analysis in particular requires reducing costs and benefits to monetary terms. Such a reduction is highly advantageous in comparing the efficacy of programs and policies with different goals, even across different social arenas. However, such a reduction is appropriate only when all costs and benefits can be converted into monetary terms successfully, or when those that cannot be converted are trivial (Levin, 1983) .
If one cannot rigorously convert costs and benefits into monetary terms, and those not convertible are important, one should conduct some other form of cost analysis. In this case, the moral dimension of the policy cannot be converted into monetary terms easily, and this dimension is non-trivial. In fact, it is disregarded altogether. (For excellent discussions of cost analyses and their uses, see Levin, 1983 Levin, , 1991 What is it in the economic point of view that induces some economists to draw such conclusions? All abstract points of view, like the economic point of view or the political point of view or the aesthetic point of view, are based on values, and sometimes these value claims are buried within the analytic framework, so much so that evaluators or economists don't realize what they are endorsing. They accept their framework too much at face value.
Sometimes they draw inappropriate conclusions because of the limited criteria they employ. In short, such abstract frameworks present a valuable but partial view of the world, and if evaluators are not careful, they may apply frameworks to the real world without realizing they are seriously incomplete. This caution is particularly appropriate for evaluators, who must draw conclusions about concrete world conditions, not abstract, academic ones.
Of course, there is a sense in which no evaluation is complete, in that no evaluation can ever include all the criteria that might be relevant to evaluating a program, policy or product. One can always find some secondary criterion that might make a difference. But evaluators must aspire, in the incompleteness of their evaluations, not to omit critical considerations. When evaluators do leave out critical criteria, their evaluations are inappropriate. In this case the problem is not so much what is included as what is left out.
Summers' Analysis
Summers' analysis is based on the comparative costs of wages and medical care in more and less developed countries, and these costs are determined by market considerations. Medical costs are higher in more developed countries because wages are higher, and hence wages foregone and medical costs incurred in developed countries mean the same unit of pollution will create more monetary damage in more developed countries. Pollution will cost more in other words. A permanent injury to a child costs more in developed countries because of medical costs and the higher wages foregone in ensuing years. Also, parents in more developed countries would pay more to avoid such injuries because they have the resources to do so. These considerations are market determined.
There are three objections to Summers' reasoning. First, he assumes that people in more and less developed countries would make exchanges of pollution for money, and that the exchanges would be beneficial for all if they did. In actuality, pollution all over the world might be increased by such exchanges. If people in polluting countries cannot export their pollution, they might be more inclined to reduce their pollution by other means, which is what has happened in many Evaluation 6(1) countries. Those in developed countries are better able to monitor pollution and more inclined to do so. This miscalculation is a matter of externalities: the exchanges do not take into account the larger public interest in curtailing pollution.
An externality occurs in a market economy when an activity carried out by one or more people affects the welfare of others, and when this effect is not transmitted through market prices (Heap et al., 1992) . That is, there is some mechanism external to the market by which some people's activities impinge on others' welfare not taken care of by the market itself.
The second objection is that the exchanges are unfair even if those in less developed countries agree to them. The two parties are hardly in equal bargaining positions. People who have money are taking advantage of those who don't. There is an element of exploitation here, particularly since developed countries generated the pollution to begin with in gaining their wealth. There is also a question whether compensating a country's government for accepting pollution would result in benefits to those who suffer. Experience would suggest payments are not distributed to those in need. Basing everything on monetary costs and benefits leaves out considerations of fairness and justice, of fairness in bargaining and justice in distribution.
The third objection against such exchanges is the way welfare is calculated. In standard economic thought, welfare is taken to be the satisfaction of individual preferences. For those employing this reasoning, the question becomes, to what extent do people prefer to avoid the effects of pollution? The cost of the consequences of pollution is the degree to which preferences are less well satisfied. The practical surrogate measure of preference satisfaction is people's willingness to pay.
If one group is willing to pay and the other to accept payment, the deal is a good one, from this point of view. Sometimes the methodology is to ask people how much money they would accept to allow the pollution to be deposited in their country. In practice, cost benefit analysts often calculate that if both sides would benefit monetarily, the exchange would occur voluntarily without bothering to ask people, which is what Summers has done. From his calculation both sides would benefit monetarily; hence, the policy is a good one.
However, in this case this exchange is not acceptable from a moral point of view. Morally, surely it is as bad to cripple a poor child as a rich one. The difference in wealth allows the exchange to take place. The economic framework builds in a wealth bias in the form of preference satisfaction as the measure of welfare and ignores issues of fairness in bargaining and justice in distribution.
Economic Reasoning
In general, economic reasoning equates the well-being of people with the satisfaction of their preferences (Hausman and McPherson, 1996) . It assumes that individuals are rational in that they seek to fulfill their own preferences, whatever those may be. Second, it assumes that individuals are self-interested, i.e. interested in the exclusive pursuit of their own individual good. Third, it assumes that House: The Limits of Cost Benefit Evaluation individuals are so well-informed that what they prefer will be what enhances their welfare. With perfect knowledge, preferences and consequences work out the same. With perfect knowledge, one can foresee what the consequences of choosing a course of action will be. Fourth, it is assumed that preferences are not deformed in odd ways, such as by false advertising or manipulated beliefs. If these assumptions are correct, it makes sense that fulfilling one's personal preferences is the same as improving one's welfare.
But satisfaction of individual preferences is not the same as welfare in the broader sense. Some people prefer to smoke, but this is not conducive to their personal welfare nor that of society. Second, although individuals are self-seeking some of the time, they are not self-seeking all the time. They have other motivations as well, even altruistic ones. As economist Amartya Sen says, Why should it be uniquely rational to pursue one's own self-interest to the exclusion of everything else? It may not, of course, be at all absurd to claim that maximization of self-interest is not irrational . . . but to argue that anything other than maximizing selfinterest must be irrational seems altogether extraordinary. (Sen, 1987: 15) Third, individuals are not perfectly informed. They are often wrong about the consequences of their actions. For example, there is considerable uncertainty and lack of knowledge about the effects of pollution. Limited knowledge is more often the case than not.
The standard neoclassical model -the formal articulation of Adam Smith's invisible hand, the contention that market economies will ensure economic efficiency -provides little guidance for the choice of economic systems, since once information imperfections . . . are brought into the analysis, as surely they must be, there is no presumption that markets are efficient. (Stiglitz, 1994: 13) Fourth, individual preferences are subject to all kinds of influences, some of which are not rational. Some preferences are ill-formed or based on false beliefs. Preference satisfaction means that expensive and anti-social preferences, e.g. racism, must be satisfied. Furthermore, preferences change over time and often conflict with one another. Preference satisfaction denies that there are objective needs to be satisfied. The idea that welfare is the same as preference satisfaction is suspect.
There is a strong normative element built into the economic framework, through concepts of rationality as calculation and welfare as preference satisfaction, and individuals being exclusively self-interested and well informed. Exchanges (or potential exchanges) determine the good. There is nothing value neutral about this framework; it is loaded with concealed values.
As Hausman and McPherson, a philosopher and an economist, put it, the issue is this:
The many evaluative questions one might ask about economic institutions, policies, and outcomes are all reduced to the single problem of evaluating outcomes in terms of the extent to which they satisfy preferences. . . . Should one rest content with evaluating policies solely according to their consequences for satisfying people's preferences . . . , or should one include in one's evaluation the consequences for freedom, equality,
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justice and indicators of quality of life that go beyond preference satisfaction? (Hausman and McPherson, 1996: 69, 208) Some evaluations sanction policies that make some people worse off, offer hypothetical compensation and are biased against the interests of the poor because preferences are weighted with dollars. They do not give voice to the marginal or excluded, they are based on unreflective and unargued preferences. Preferences about public goods should be subject to debate and analysis before public choices are made so that people can change their minds on reflection and not take unexamined preferences for granted as the basis of policies and programs.
Value-Free Economics
Some economists view economics as a purely technical discipline and some assert that economics is a value-free science. They claim that economics is like engineering in that someone else determines the need for a dam, and engineers build it. Engineers need not worry about whether to build the dam initially. That's the role of politicians and government. Economists supply technical advice, mostly cause and effect information, and someone else determines the ends. In simplified form:
1. The policy should achieve goal G and satisfy constraint C; 2. X achieves G and satisfies C; 3. Thus, the policy should be to do X.
For example, Klappholz (1984) provides this example of value-free economics approvingly:
1. The government ought to take any measure to raise the level of employment whenever unemployment exceeds x percent; 2. The present level of unemployment exceeds x percent; 3. Action A will raise the level of employment; 4. The government should take action A.
The first premise comes from authorized decision makers and the others from economics. In the value-free view, the information supplied by economists is purely descriptive. 'Since the scientific part of economics consists exclusively of descriptive statements, it cannot have any ethical entailments, and is therefore value-free' (Klappholz, 1984: 277) .
This value-free position is based on the fact-value distinction. Facts and values are separate and independent of one another. Questions concerning facts -technical issues, like cause and effect -are not settled by values, and those concerning values are not determined by facts. In fact, some economists take this view farther than do most social scientists, according to Nobel Laureate Sen:
I guess it is a reflection of the way ethics tends to be viewed by economists that statements suspected of being 'meaningless' or 'nonsensical' are promptly taken to be 'ethical'. The peculiarly narrow view of 'meaning' championed by the logical positivists -enough to cause disorder in philosophy itself -caused total chaos in welfare House: The Limits of Cost Benefit Evaluation economics when it was supplemented by some additional home-grown confusions liberally supplied by economists themselves. (Sen, 1987: 31) The result is a version of rationality in which values are divorced from facts and ends separated from means. This mentality may be manifested especially in large bureaucracies in which ends have been determined by someone else (MacIntyre, 1981) . Technical rationality consists of matching means to ends effectively and efficiently. Reasoning in such matters is calculative means to ends, the mark of the neutral expert. Managers view themselves as neutral administrators who should not engage in moral debate.
Although no doubt there are economic problems that are technical, it can hardly be the case that most economic problems resolve into purely technical ones in applied economics. One cannot talk about transferring pollution to developing countries without embracing value claims along the way. Philosopher Charles Taylor puts the issue this way, But there is also a widespread unease that instrumental reason not only has enlarged its scope but also threatens to take over our lives. The fear is that things that ought to be determined by other criteria will be decided in terms of efficiency or 'cost-benefit' analysis, that the independent ends that ought to be guiding our lives will be eclipsed by the demand to maximize output. There are lots of things one can point to that give substance to this worry: for instance, the ways the demands of economic growth are used to justify very unequal distributions of wealth and income, or the way these same demands make us insensitive to the needs of the environment, even to the point of potential disaster. (Taylor, 1991: 5) Such reasoning leads one to think that a reason for or against something is determined by what the individual is aiming at. Since different people aim at different things and are not in agreement as to aims, one must assume either that there is one objectively determined end or abandon argument about ends and focus on means instead. Cost-benefit analysis supplies the most efficient means. Efficiency becomes the over-riding criterion for evaluation.
The Background of Value-Free Reasoning
How have we arrived at such reasoning? According to anthropologist Ernest Gellner (1983) , the core rational mentality of industrial capitalist society consists of two central ideas. First is the notion of consistency -like treatment for all things, as represented in the bureaucratic mentality. Second is the idea of efficiency, the selection of the best means to given ends. And these two concepts work together to produce or require standard (best) means to given ends. Government agencies often try to determine the best program across some general population and mandate it. The saga of the Follow Through evaluation was such an endeavor (House et al., 1978) .
Behind these two central concepts is the notion that facts are conceived as located in a single continuous space which can be analyzed and rearranged. There are no special, privileged, insulated facts safe from analysis and rearrangement, no sacred sub-worlds which must be protected from manipulation. By contrast, Evaluation 6(1) traditional world views that preceded the capitalist mentality bound things together in cognitive 'packages' in which there were stable social groupings and in which parts of the world were protected from change; some parts were even given sacred status. But the modern entrepreneurial attitude is one of perpetual improvement and innovation, interminable exploration and no-holds barred change. Everything can be rearranged for improvement and profit.
In this view, one can separate things in thought first, then in actuality. Inquiry should not be bound by natural affinities nor traditional associations. Rather, entrepreneurs can take anything apart and put back it back together more efficiently and profitably. Such reasoning has been advantageous in converting traditional societies into non-traditional ones (Gellner, 1983) . This mentality treats people and things as means to more efficient ends, either ends given by someone else or as individual preference satisfaction, as portrayed by Charles Taylor.
The first is the picture of the subject as ideally disengaged, that is, as free and rational to the extent that he has fully distinguished himself from the natural and social worlds, so that his identity is no longer to be defined in terms of what lies outside him in these worlds. The second, which flows from this, is a punctual view of the self, ideally ready as free and rational to treat these worlds -and even some of the features of his own character -instrumentally, as subject to change and reorganization in order the better to secure the welfare of himself and others. The third is the social consequence of the first two: an atomistic construal of society as constituted by, or ultimately to be explained in terms of, individual purposes. (Taylor, 1995: 7) Such a perspective is not unknown in evaluation. Individual purposes reduce to individual preferences devoid of moral or social implications, a reduction which can lead to serious ethical and moral problems. If everything reduces to individual preferences, then right and wrong become only right and wrong for one person or from a particular point of view. There is no right and wrong generally. Emotivism and relativism obliterate the distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative relationships.
On the one hand, there is the technical solution to this problem: seek efficiency of means and elevate that criterion to premier status, which is what Summers' evaluation of pollution policies does. An inability to come to grips with the moral can lead to choosing the course that costs the least money. But with stunning moral deficiencies. This view leads to technical expertise offering 'value-neutral' solutions based on common outcomes.
An alternative is to say that there are no values more important than others and to dissolve value issues into the relativism of postmodernism, where every individual's ideas and values are as good as everyone else's. Again, there is no right or wrong, only yours or mine.
But surely the relativism expressed in Hume's dictum that it is no more contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the entire world to the scratching of one's little finger is incorrect (Baier, 1995) . Such a conclusion is opposed to reason, rightly understood as incorporating many considerations, even moral ones, in arriving at value claims. Reason can justify ends and determine which
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